240 ANIMAL AUTOMATISM v 



states of consciousness of brutes. Is there any 

 evidence that these states of consciousness may, 

 conversely, cause those molecular changes which 

 give rise to muscular motion ? I see no such 



o 



evidence. The frog walks, hops, swims, and goes 

 through his gymnastic performances quite as well 

 without consciousness, and consequently without 

 volition, as with it ; and, if a frog, in his natural 

 state, possesses anything corresponding with what 

 we call volition, there is no reason to think that it 

 is anything but a concomitant of the molecular 

 changes in the brain which form part of the series 

 involved in the production of motion. 



The consciousness of brutes would appear to be 

 related to the mechanism of their body simply as 

 a collateral product of its working, and to be as 

 completely without any power of modifying that 

 working as the steam-whistle which accompanies 

 the work of a locomotive engine is without in- 

 fluence upon its machinery. Their volition, if 

 they have any, is an emotion indicative of physical 

 changes, not a cause of such changes. 



This conception of the relations of states of con- 

 sciousness with molecular changes in the brain 

 of psychoses with neuroses does not prevent us 

 from ascribing free will to brutes. For an agent 

 is free when there is nothing to prevent him from 

 doing that which he desires to do. If a greyhound 

 chases a hare, he is a free agent, because his 

 action is in entire accordance with his strong 



