v ANIMAL AUTOMATISM 241 



desire to catch the hare ; while so long as he is 

 held back by the leash he is not free, being pre- 

 vented by external force from following his inclin- 

 ation. And the ascription of freedom to the 

 greyhound under the former circumstances is by 

 no means inconsistent with the other aspect of 

 the facts of the case that he is a machine im- 

 pelled to the chase, and caused, at the same time, 

 to have the desire to catch the game by the 

 impression which the rays of light proceeding 

 from the hare make upon his eyes, and through 

 them upon his brain. 



Much ingenious argument has at various times 

 been bestowed upon the question : How is it 

 possible to imagine that volition, which is a 

 state of consciousness, and, as such, has not the 

 slightest community of nature with matter in 

 motion, can act upon the moving matter of which 

 the body is composed, as it is assumed to do in 

 voluntary acts ? But if, as is here suggested, the 

 voluntary acts of brutes or, in other words, the 

 acts which they desire to perform are as purely 

 mechanical as the rest of their actions, and are 

 simply accompanied by the state of consciousness 

 called volition, the inquiry, so far as they are con- 

 cerned, becomes superfluous. Their volitions do 

 not enter into the chain of causation of their 

 actions at all. 



The hypothesis that brutes are conscious 

 automata is perfectly consistent with any view 



VOL. I. R 



