VI ADMINISTRATIVE NIHILISM 



moment, and he contemplates its abolition when 

 it ceases to do its duty, and its replacement by 

 another, as a matter of course. The great cham- 

 pion of the revolution of 1688 could do no less. 

 Nor is it otherwise than natural that he should 

 seek to limit, rather than to enlarge, the powers 

 of the State, though in substance he entirely 

 agrees with Hobbes's view of its duties : 



" But though men," says he, " when they enter into society, 

 give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in. 

 the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far 

 disposed of by the Legislature as the good of society shall 

 require ; yet it being only with an intention in every one the. 

 better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no 

 rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with 

 an intention to be worse), the power of the society, or. legislation, 

 constituted by them can never be supposed to extend further 

 than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's pro- 

 perty by providing against those three defects above mentioned, 

 that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, who- 

 ever has the legislative or supremepower of any commonwealth, 

 is boujad_to govern by established standing laws, promulgated 

 and known to the people, and liot by extemporary decrees ; 'by 

 indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide .controversii-s 

 by those laws : and to employ the force of the community at 

 home only in the execution of such laws j or abroad, to prevent 

 or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from in- 

 roads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end 

 than the peace, safety^juid public good of the people." 1 



Just as in the case of Hobbes, so in that of 

 Locke, it may at first sight appear from this pas- 

 sage that the latter philosopher's views of the 

 1 Locke's Essay, Of Civil Government, 131. 



