156 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS v 



volition, though they are no inconsiderable " kinds 

 of action to which the nervous system ministers," 

 and memory has a place in his classification only 

 by implication. Secondly, we are told that the 

 second "kind of action to which the nervous 

 system ministers " is " that in which stimuli from 

 without result in sensations through the agency 

 of which their due effects are wrought out. 

 Sensation." Does this really mean that, in the 

 writer's opinion, " sensation " is the " agent " by 

 which the " due effect " of the stimulus, which 

 gives rise to sensation, is " wrought out " ? 

 Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The 

 " due effect " of that particular stimulus will 

 probably be threefold ; namely, a sensation of 

 pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. 

 Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that 

 the " sensation " is the " agent " by which the 

 other two phenomena are wrought out ? 



But these matters are of little moment to 

 anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who 

 may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho- 

 logy, from him. The really interesting point is 

 this, that when he fully admits that animals 

 " may possess all the first four groups of actions," 

 he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of 

 the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in 

 animals " impressions received result in sensations 

 which give rise to the observation of sensible 

 objects," and that they have what he calls 



