20 HUME I 



Hume then points out that, in his time, the 

 authority of the Commons was by no means 

 equivalent to the property and power it repre- 

 sented, and proceeds : 



"Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their 

 constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter 

 the case ; and if such immense power and riches as those of all 

 the Commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, 

 it is not easy to conceive that the crown could either influence 

 that multitude of people, or withstand that balance of property. 

 It is true, the crown has great influence over the collective 

 body in the elections of members ; but were this influence, 

 which at present is only exerted once in seven years, to be 

 employed in bringing over the people to every vote, it would 

 soon be wasted, and no skill, popularity, or revenue could 

 support it. I must, therefore, be of opinion that an alteration 

 in this particular would introduce a total alteration in our 

 government, would soon reduce it to a pure republic ; and, 

 perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient form." (III. 35.) 



Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this 

 is surely a very remarkable example of political 

 sagacity. The members of the House of Commons 

 are not yet delegates ; but, with the widening of, 

 the suffrage and the rapidly increasing tendency 

 to drill and organise the electorate, and to exact 

 definite pledges from candidates, they are rapidly 

 becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for 

 committees of electors. The same causes are con- 

 stantly tending to exclude men, who combine a 

 keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual 

 capacity, from a position in which the one is as 

 constantly offended, as the other is neutralised. 



