I OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY 69 



osophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole 

 world of thought. Wherever it espies sophistry 

 or superstition they are to be bidden to stand ; 

 nay, they are to be followed to their very dens 

 and there apprehended and exterminated, as 

 Othello smothered Desdemona, " else she'll betray 

 more men." 



Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth 

 the labours meet for the strength and the courage 

 of the Hercules of " mitigated scepticism/' 



"Here, indeed, lies the justest and moat plausible objection 

 against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not 

 properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts 

 of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly 

 inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular 

 superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair 

 ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and protect 

 their weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers 

 fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every 

 unguarded avenue of the mind and overwhelm it with religious 

 fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remits his 

 watch a moment, is oppressed ; and many, through cowardice 

 and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly 

 receive them with reverence and submission as their legal 

 sovereigns. 



"But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should 

 desist from such researches and leave superstition still in 

 possession of her retreat ? Is it not proper to draw an opposite 

 conclusion, and perceive the necessity of carrying the war into 



the most secret recesses of the enemy ? The only 



method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions, 

 is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, 

 and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, 

 that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse 



