II THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND 73 



The popular classification and terminology of 

 the phenomena of consciousness, however, are by 

 no means the first crude conceptions suggested by 

 common sense, but rather a legacy, and, in many 

 respects, a sufficiently damnosa hcereditas, of 

 ancient philosophy, more or less leavened by 

 theology ; which has incorporated itself with the 

 common thought of later times, as the vices of the 

 aristocracy of one age become those of the mob in 

 the next. Very little attention to what passes in 

 the mind is sufficient to show, that these con- 

 ceptions involve assumptions of an extremely 

 hypothetical character. And the first business 

 of the student of psychology is to get rid of such 

 prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental 

 phenomena as they are given us by observation, 

 without any hypothetical admixture, or with only 

 so much as is definitely recognised and held 

 subject to confirmation or otherwise ; to classify 

 these phenomena according to their clearly 

 recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomen- 

 clature which suggests nothing beyond the results 

 of observation. Thus chastened, observation of 

 the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but 

 certain events, facts, or phenomena (whichever 

 name be preferred) which pass over the inward 

 field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on 

 careless inspection, in disorderly succession, like 

 the shifting patterns of a kaleidoscope. To all 

 these mental phenomena, or states of our 



