90 HUME 



III 



a fire ; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither 

 on perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they 

 are confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions 

 arising from the particular configurations and motions of the 

 parts of the body, wherein possibly can their difference consist? 

 Upon the whole then, we may conclude that, as far as the senses 

 are judges all perceptions are the same in the manner of their 

 existence." (I. p. 250, 251.) 



The last words of this passage are as much 

 Berkeley's as Hume's. But, instead of following 

 Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus 

 laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation 

 shows, fully adopted the conclusion to which all 

 that we know of psychological physiology tends, 

 that the origin of the elements of consciousness, 

 no less than that of all its otJier states, is to be 

 sought in bodily changes, the seat of which can 

 only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had 

 already done with less effect, he states and refutes 

 the arguments commonly brought against the 

 possibility of a causal connection between the 

 modes of motion of the cerebral substance and 

 states of consciousness, with great clearness : 



"From these hypotheses concerning the substance and local 

 conjunction of our perceptions we may pass to another, which 

 is more intelligible than the former, and more important than 

 the latter, viz. concerning the cause of our perceptions. Matter 

 and motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, 

 are still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in 

 the position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as 

 you please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever 

 results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any 



