Ill THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS 101 



invariably generated in the mind, when certain 

 experiences arise in it, just as sensations are in- 

 variably generated when certain bodily motions 

 take place ; they are universal, inasmuch as they 

 arise under the same conditions in all men ; 

 they are necessary, because their genesis under 

 these conditions is invariable. These innate 

 thoughts are what Descartes terms " veYites " or 

 truths : that is beliefs and his notions respecting 

 them are plainly set forth in a passage of the 

 " Principes." 



"Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things : 

 it remains that I should speak of that which we know as truths. 

 For example, when we think that it is impossible to make any- 

 thing out of nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is 

 a thing which exists, or a property of something, but we take 

 it for a certain eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind 

 (penste), and is called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, 

 when we affirm that it is impossible that one and the same thing 

 should exist and not exist at the same time ; that that which 

 has been created should not have been created ; that he who 

 thinks must exist while he thinks ; and a number of other like 

 propositions ; these are only truths, and not things which exist 

 outside our thoughts. And there is such a number of these that 

 it would be wearisome to enumerate them : nor is it necessary to 

 do so, because we cannot fail to know them when the occasion 

 of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not blinded 

 by any prejudices." 



It would appear that Locke was not more 

 familiar with Descartes' writings than Hume 

 seems to have been ; for, viewed in relation to 

 the passages just cited, the arguments adduced in 



