112 HUME IV 



Thus our ideas of single complex impressions 

 are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, 

 more or less similar, complex impressions are in- 

 complete in another way ; that is to say, they are 

 generic, not specific. And hence it follows, that 

 our ideas of the impressions in question are not, 

 in the strict sense of the word, copies of those im- 

 pressions ; while at the same time, they may exist 

 in the mind independently of language. 



The generic ideas which are formed from several 

 similar, but not identical, complex experiences are 

 what are commonly called abstract or general 

 ideas ; and Berkeley endeavoured to prove that 

 all general ideas are nothing but particular ideas 

 annexed to a certain term, which gives them a 

 more extensive signification, and makes them 

 recall, upon occasion, other individuals which are 

 similar to them. Hume says that he regards this 

 as " one of the greatest and the most valuable dis- 

 coveries that has been made of late years in the 

 republic of letters," and endeavours to confirm it 

 in such a manner that it shall be " put beyond all 

 doubt and controversy." 



I may venture to express a doubt whether he 

 has succeeded in his object ; but the subject 

 is an abstruse one ; and I must content 

 myself with the remark, that though Berkeley's 

 view appears to be largely applicable to such 

 general ideas as are formed after language 

 has been acquired, and to all the more abstract 



