118 HUME 



IV 



of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation 

 of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel 

 the passion of love, when we receive benefits, or hatred, when 

 we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of 

 natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought 

 and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent." 

 (IV. pp. 5256.) 



The only comment that appears needful here is, 

 that Hume has attached somewhat too exclusive 

 a weight to that repetition of experiences to which 

 alone the term " custom " can be properly applied. 

 The proverb says that " a burnt child dreads the 

 fire " ; and any one who will make the experiment 

 will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to 

 establish an indissoluble belief that contact with 

 fire and pain go together. 



As a sort of inverted memory, expectation 

 follows the same laws ; hence, while a belief of 

 expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, 

 established by custom, or the repetition of weak 

 impressions, it may quite well be based upon a 

 single strong experience. In the absence of 

 language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened 

 by repetition. It is obvious that that which has 

 happened cannot happen again, with the same 

 collateral associations of co-existence and succes- 

 sion. But, memories of the co-existence and 

 succession of impresions are capable of being 

 indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of 

 similar impressions, in the same order, even 

 though the collateral associations are totally 



