128 HUME V 



f erring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of 

 reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard 

 to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the 

 brute creation ; and the conclusion being once firmly established 

 in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules of 

 analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any 

 exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, 

 from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual 

 attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of 

 the one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which 

 we denominate belief. No other explication can be given of 

 this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sen- 

 sitive beings which fall under our notice and observation." 

 (IV. pp. 1224.) 



It will be observed that Hume appears to 

 contrast the " inference of the animal " with the 

 " process of argument or reasoning in man." But 

 it would be a complete misapprehension of his 

 intention, if we were to suppose, that he thereby 

 means to imply that there is any real difference 

 between the two processes. The "inference of 

 the animal" is a potential belief of expectation; 

 the process of argument, or reasoning in man is 

 based upon potential beliefs of expectation, which 

 are formed in the man exactly in the same way as 

 in the animal. But, in men endowed with speech 

 the mental state which constitutes the potential 

 belief is represented by a verbal proposition, and 

 thus becomes what all the world recognises as a 

 belief. The fallacy which Hume combats is, that 

 the proposition, or verbal representative of a 

 belief, has come to be regarded as a reality, 



