CHAPTER VI 



LANGUAGE PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECES- 

 SARY TRUTHS 



THOUGH we may accept Hume's conclusion 

 that speechless animals think, believe, and reason ; 

 yet, it must be borne in mind, that there is an 

 important difference between the signification of 

 the terms when applied to them and when ap- 

 plied to those animals which possess language. The 

 thoughts of the former are trains of mere feelings ; 

 those of the latter are, in addition, trains of the 

 ideas of the signs which represent feelings, and 

 which are called " words." 



A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the 

 idea of which is, by repetition, so closely associated 

 with the idea of the simple or complex feeling 

 which it represents, that the association becomes 

 indissoluble. No Englishman, for example, can 

 think of the word "dog" without immediately 

 having the idea of the group of impressions to 

 which that name is given ; and conversely, the 



