VI CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS 137 



Hume does not discuss the nature of language, 

 but so much of what remains to be said, concern- 

 ing his philosophical tenets, turns upon the value 

 and the origin of verbal propositions, that this 

 summary sketch of the relations of language to the 

 thinking process will probably not be deemed 

 superfluous. 



So large an extent of the field of thought is 

 traversed by Hume, in his discussion of the verbal 

 propositions in which mankind enshrine their 

 beliefs, that it would be impossible to follow him 

 throughout all the windings of his long journey, 

 within the limits of this essay. I purpose, there- 

 fore, to limit myself to those propositions which 

 concern 1. Necessary Truths; 2. The order of 

 Nature; 3. The Soul; 4. Theism; 5. The Passions 

 and Volition ; 6. The Principle of Morals. 



Hume's views respecting necessary truths, and 

 more particularly concerning causation, have, more 

 than any other part of his teaching, contributed to 

 give him a prominent place in the history of 

 philosophy. 



"All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally 

 be divided into two kinds, to wit, relations of ideas and matters 

 of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, 

 and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either 

 intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the 

 hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition 

 which expresses a relation between these two figures. That 

 three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation 



