158 HUME 



VII 



we mean only " extremely wonderful events," there 

 can be no just ground for denying the possibility 

 of their occurrence. 



But when we turn from the question of the 

 possibility of miracles, however they may be de- 

 fined, in the abstract, to that respecting the 

 grounds upon which we are justified in believing 

 any particular miracle, Hume's arguments have a 

 very different value, for they resolve themselves 

 into a simple statement of the dictates of common 

 sense which may be expressed in this canon : the 

 more a statement of fact conflicts with previous 

 experience, the more complete must be the 

 evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It 

 is upon this principle that every one carries on the 

 business of common life. If a man tells me he saw 

 a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without 

 hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and 

 there is no imaginable motive for his deceiving me. 

 But if the same person tells me he observed a zebra 

 there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his 

 testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only 

 as to his previous acquaintance with zebras, but 

 as to his powers and opportunities of obser- 

 vation in the present case. If, however, my in- 

 formant assured me that he beheld a centaur 

 trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I should 

 emphatically decline to credit his statement ; and 

 this even if he were the most saintly of men and 



