172 HUME 



VIII 



Such being the sum total of Hume's conclusions 

 it cannot be said that his theological burden is a 

 heavy one. But, if we turn from the "Natural 

 History of Religion," to the "Treatise," the 

 "Inquiry," and the " Dialogues," the story of what 

 happened to the ass laden with salt, who took to the 

 water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume's theism, 

 such as it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, 

 until nothing is left but the verbal sack in which 

 it was contained. 



Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume 

 is committed, the first is the affirmation of the 

 existence of a God, supported by the argument 

 from the nature of causation. In the " Dialogues," 

 Philo, while pushing scepticism to its utmost 

 limit, is nevertheless made to say that 



". . . . where reasonable men treat these subjects, the ques- 

 tion can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature of 

 the Deity. The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestion- 

 able and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the 

 original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, 

 and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection." (II. p. 

 439.) 



The expositor of Hume, who wishes to do his 

 work thoroughly, as far as it goes, cannot but fall 



be meant as a jest, and more than questionable in morality, if it is 

 to be taken in earnest. To pretend that you believe any doctrine 

 for no better reason than that you doubt everything else, would be 

 dishonest, if it were not preposterous. 



