viii THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY 173 



into perplexity l when he contrasts this language 

 with that of the sections of the third part of the 

 " Treatise," entitled, Why a Cause is Always Neces- 

 sary and Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 



It is there shown at large that, " every demonstra- 

 tion which has been produced for the necessity of a 

 cause is fallacious and sophistical" (I. p. Ill) ; it 

 is affirmed, that " there is no absolute nor meta- 

 physical necessity that every beginning of existence 

 should be attended with such an object" [as a 

 cause] (I. p. 227) ; and it is roundly asserted, that 



1 A perplexity which is increased rather than diminished by 

 some passages in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto (March 10, 

 1751). Hume says, "You would perceive by the sample I 

 have given you that I make Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue ; 

 whatever you can think of, to strengthen that side of the argu- 

 ment, will be most acceptable to me. Any propensity you 

 imagine I have to the other side crept in upon me against my 

 will ; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript 

 book, wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after 

 page, the gradual progress of my thoughts on this head. It 

 began with an anxious scent after arguments to confirm the 

 common opinion ; doubts stole in, dissipated, returned ; were 

 again dissipated, returned again ; and it was a perpetual struggle 

 of a restless imagination against inclination perhaps against 

 reason. ... I could wish Cleanthes' argument could be so 

 analysed as to be rendered quite formal and regular. The pro- 

 pensity of the mind towards it unless that propensity were as 

 strong and universal as that to believe in our senses and exper- 

 ience will still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious founda- 

 tion. 'Tis here I wish for your assistance. "We must endeavour 

 to prove that this propensity is somewhat different from our 

 inclination to find our own figures in the clouds, our faces in the 

 moon, our passions and sentiments even in inanimate matter. 

 Such an inclination may and ought to be controlled, and can never 

 be a legitimate ground of assent." (Burton, Life, I. pp. 331 

 3. ) The picture of Hume here drawn unconsciously by his own 

 hand, is unlike enough to the popular conception of him as a 

 careless sceptic, loving doubt for doubt's sake. 



