198 HUME 



IX 



to-morrow, and all are connected by the links of 

 cause and effect. 



". . . . as the same individual republic may not only change 

 its members, but also its laws and constitutions ; in like 

 manner the same person may vary his character and disposi- 

 tion, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his 

 identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are 

 still connected by the relation of causation. And, in this view, 

 our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate 

 that with regard to the imagination, by the making our 

 distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a 

 present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures. 



' ' As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and 

 extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, 

 upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. 

 Had we no memory we never should have any notion of 

 causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects 

 which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired 

 this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the 

 same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our 

 persons, beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and 

 circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but 

 suppose in general to have existed. For how few of our past 

 actions are there of which we have any memory ? Who can 

 tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on 

 the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the 

 third of August, 1733 ? Or will he affirm, because he has 

 entirely forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self 

 is not the same person with the self of that time, and by that 

 means overturn all the most established notions of personal 

 identity ? In this view, therefore, memory does not so much 

 produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation 

 of cause and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be 

 incumbent on those who affirm that memory produces entirely 

 our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend 

 our identity beyond our memory. 



" The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which 



