IX THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY 207 



resembles what we mean by justice, the bestowal 

 of infinite happiness for finite well-doing and in- 

 finite misery for finite ill-doing, it is in no sense 

 just. And, if the justice of God does not resemble 

 what we mean by justice, it is an abuse of 

 language to employ the name of justice for the 

 attribute described by it. But, as against those 

 who choose to argue that there is nothing in what 

 is known to us of the attributes of the Deity in- 

 consistent with a future state of rewards and 

 punishments, Hume's pleadings have no force. 

 Bishop Butler's argument that, inasmuch as the 

 visitation of our acts by rewards and punishments 

 takes place in this life, rewards and punishments 

 must be consistent with the attributes of the 

 Deity, and therefore may go on as long as the 

 mind endures, is unanswerable. Whatever exists 

 is, by the' hypothesis, existent by the will of God ; 

 and, therefore, the pains and pleasures which 

 exist now may go on existing for all eternity, 

 either increasing, diminishing, or being endlessly 

 varied in their intensity, as they are now. 



It is remarkable that Hume does not refer to 

 the sentimental arguments for the immortality of 

 the soul which are so much in vogue at the 

 present day ; and which are based upon our desire 

 for a longer conscious existence than that which 

 nature appears to have allotted to us. Perhaps 

 he did not think them worth notice. For indeed 

 it is not a little strange, that our strong desire 



