208 HUME 



IX 



that a certain occurrence should happen should 

 be put forward as evidence that it will happen. 

 If my intense desire to see the friend, from whom 

 I have parted, does not bring him from the other 

 side of the world, or take me thither; if the 

 mother's agonised prayer that her child should 

 live has not prevented him from dying ; experi- 

 ence certainly affords no presumption that the 

 strong desire to be alive after death, which we 

 call the aspiration after immortality, is any more 

 likely to be gratified. As Hume truly says, " All 

 doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured 

 by our passions ; " and the doctrine, that we are 

 immortal because we should extremely like to be 

 so, contains the quintessence of suspiciousness. 



In respect of the existence and attributes of 

 the soul, as of those of the Deity, then, logic 

 is powerless and reason silent. At the most 

 we can get no further than the conclusion of 

 Kant : 



"After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all the 

 ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds of expe- 

 rience, enough remains of practical value to content us. It is 

 true that no one may boast that he knows that God and a future 

 life exist ; for, if he possesses such knowledge, he is just the 

 man for whom I have long been seeking. All knowledge 

 (touching an object of mere reason) can be communicated, and 

 therefore I might hope to see my own knowledge increased to 

 this prodigious extent, by his instruction. No ; our conviction 

 in these matters ie not logical, but moral certainty ; and, inas- 

 much as it rests upon subjective grounds, (of moral disposition) 



