IX THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY 209 



I must not even say : it is morally certain that there is a 

 God, and so on ; but, I am morally certain, and so on. That 

 is to say : the belief in a God and in another world is so inter- 

 woven with my moral nature, that the former can no more 

 vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from me. 



" The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith 

 of the intellect ( Vernunftglaiibe] assumes the existence of moral 

 dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind 

 quite indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason 

 becomes merely a subject for speculation ; and [the conclusion 

 attained] may then indeed be supported by strong arguments 

 from analogy, but not by such as are competent to overcome 

 persistent scepticism. 



"There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in 

 these questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral 

 influences by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this 

 case, enough remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a 

 future state. To this end, no more is necessary than that he 

 can at least have no certainty that there is no such being, and 

 no future life ; for, to make this conclusion demonstratively 

 certain, he must be able to prove the impossibility of both ; 

 and this assuredly no rational man can undertake to do. This 

 negative belief, indeed, cannot produce either morality or good 

 dispositions, but can operate in an analogous fashion, by power- 

 fully repressing the outbreak of evil tendencies. 



" But it will be said, is this all that Pure Reason can do when 

 it gazes out beyond the bounds of experience ? Nothing more 

 than two articles of faith ? Common sense could achieve as 

 much without calling the philosophers to its counsels ! 



" I will not here speak of the service which philosophy has 

 rendered to human reason by the laborious efforts of its criti- 

 cism, granting that the outcome proves to be merely negative : 

 about that matter something is to be said in the following 

 section. But do you then ask, that the knowledge which 

 interests all men shall transcend the common understanding 

 and be discovered for you only by philosophers ? The very 

 thing which you make a reproach, is the best confirmation of 

 the jiistice of the previous conclusions, since it shows that which 



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