210 HUME 



IX 



could not, at first, have been anticipated ; namely, that in 

 those matters which concern all men alike, nature is not guilty 

 of distributing her gifts with partiality ; and that the highest 

 philosophy, in dealing with the most important concerns of 

 humanity, is able to take us no further than the guidance which 

 she affords to the commonest understanding." 1 



In short, nothing can be proved or disproved 

 respecting either the distinct existence, the 

 substance, or the durability of the soul. So far, 

 Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as 

 you cannot disprove the immortality of the soul, 

 and as the belief therein is very useful for moral 

 purposes, you may assume it. To which, had 

 Hume lived half a century later, he would prob- 

 ably have replied, that, if morality has no better 

 foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to 

 bear much strain ; and, if it has a better found- 

 ation, the assumption rather weakens than 

 strengthens it. 



As has been already said, Hume is not content 

 with denying that we know anything about the 

 existence or the nature of the soul ; but he carries 

 the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those 

 who affirm the immateriality, simplicity, and 

 indivisibility of the thinking substance of atheism 

 and Spinozism, which are assumed to be con- 

 vertible terms. 



The method of attack is ingenious. Observa- 

 tion appears to acquaint us with two different 

 systems of beings, and both Spinoza and orthodox 

 1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547- 



