CHAPTER X 



VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY 



IN the opening paragraphs of the third part of 

 the second book of the " Treatise," Hume gives a 

 description of the will. 



' ' Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is 

 none more remarkable than the will; and though, properly 

 speaking, it be not comprehended among the passions, yet as 

 the full understanding of its nature and properties is neces- 

 sary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it the 

 subject of our inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by 

 the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel, 

 and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new 

 motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. This im- 

 pression, like the preceding ones of pride and humility, love 

 and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe 

 any further." (II. p. 150.) 



This description of volition may be criticised on 

 various grounds. More especially does it seem 

 defective in restricting the term "will" to that 

 feeling which arises when we act, or appear to 

 act, as causes : for one may will to strike, with- 



