214 HUME X 



nomena we consider can have nothing to do with 

 the origin of the conception that they are connected 

 by the relation of cause and effect. For that 

 relation is nothing but an order of succession, 

 which, so far as our experience goes, is invariable ; 

 and it is obvious that the nature of phenomena 

 has nothing to do with their order. Whatever it 

 is that leads us to seek for a cause for every event, 

 in the case of the phenomena of the external 

 world, compels us, with equal cogency, to seek it in 

 that of the mind. 



The only meaning of the law of causation, in the 

 physical world, is, that it generalises universal ex- 

 perience of the order of that world ; and, if experi- 

 ence shows a similar order to obtain among states 

 of consciousness, the law of causation will properly 

 express that order. 



That such an order exists, however, is acknow- 

 ledged by every sane man : 



"Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises 

 entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of 

 nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, 

 and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from 

 the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the. 

 whole of that necessity which we ascribe to matter. Beyond 

 the constant conjunction of similar objects and the consequent 

 inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any 

 necessity of connexion. 



"If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever 

 allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two cir- 

 cumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in 

 the operations of mind, it must follow that all mankind have 



