220 HUME X 



(or a Velleity as it is called in the schools), even on that side 

 on which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we 

 persuade ourselves, could at that time have been completed into 

 the thing itself ; because, should that be denied, we find upon a 

 second tiial that at present it can. We consider not that the 

 fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our 

 actions." (IV. p. 110, note.) 



Moreover the moment the attempt is made to 

 give a definite meaning to the words, the sup- 

 posed opposition between free will and necessity 

 turns out to be a mere verbal dispute. 



"For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary 

 actions ? We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little 

 connexion with motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that 

 one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the 

 other, and that one affords no inference by which we can 

 conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and 

 acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only 

 mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determina- 

 tions of the will ; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we 

 may ; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypo- 

 thetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one 

 who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of 

 dispute." (IV. p. 111.) 



Half the controversies about the freedom of the 

 will would have had no existence, if this pithy 

 paragraph had been well pondered by those who 

 oppose the doctrine of necessity. For they rest 

 upon the absurd presumption that the proposition, 

 " I can do as I like," is contradictory to the doctrine 

 of necessity. The answer is ; nobody doubts that, 

 at any rate within certain limits, you can do as 



