X VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY 223 



accompanies them. Common language tells us 

 this, when it uses " well disposed " as the equi- 

 valent of "good," and "evil-minded" as that of 

 " wicked." If A does something which puts B in 

 a violent passion, it is quite possible to admit that 

 B's passion is the necessary consequence of A's 

 act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally 

 wrong, or that he ought to control it. In fact, a 

 calm bystander would reason with both on the 

 assumption of moral necessity. He would say to 

 A, " You were wrong in doing a thing which you 

 knew (that is, of the necessity of which you were 

 convinced) would irritate B." And he would say 

 to B, " You are wrong to give way to passion, for 

 you know its evil effects " that is the necessary 

 connection between yielding to passion and evil. 



So far, therefore, from necessity destroying 

 moral responsibility, it is the foundation of all 

 praise and blame ; and moral admiration reaches 

 its climax in the ascription of necessary goodness 

 to the Deity. 



To the statement of another consequence of the 

 necessarian doctrine, that, if there be a God, he 

 must be the cause of all evil as well as of all good, 

 Hume gives no real reply probably because none 

 is possible. But then, if this conclusion is dis- 

 tinctly and unquestionably deducible from the 

 doctrine of necessity, it is no less unquestionably 

 a direct consequence of every known form of 

 monotheism. If God is the cause of all things, 



