230 HUME 



XI 



mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient assurance that he can 

 never be considerably mistaken in framing the catalogue, or 

 incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his contem- 

 plation : He needs only enter into his own breast for a moment, 

 and consider whether he should or should not desire to 

 have this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such 

 or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. 

 The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in 

 forming a judgment of this nature ; and as every tongue pos- 

 sesses one set of words which are taken in a good sense, and 

 another in the opposite, the least acquaintance with the idiom 

 suffices, without any reasoning, to direct us in collecting and 

 arranging the estimable or blamable qualities of men. The 

 only object of reasoning is to discover the circumstances on 

 both sides, which are common to these qualities ; to observe 

 that particular in which the estimable qualities agree on the one 

 hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach the 

 foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from 

 which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As 

 this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only 

 expect success by following the experimental method, and 

 deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular 

 instances. The other scientifical method, where a general 

 abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched 

 out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more 

 perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, 

 and is a common source of illusion and mistake, in this as well 

 as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for 

 hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken 

 to no arguments but those which are derived from experience. 

 It is full time they should attempt a like reformation in all 

 moral disquisitions ; and reject every system of ethics, however 

 subtile or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observa- 

 tion." (IV. pp. 2424.) 



No qualities give a man a greater claim to 

 personal merit than benevolence and justice ; but 

 if we inquire why benevolence deserves so much 



