232 HUME 



XI 



individual possessed within himself every faculty requisite both 

 for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kind : 

 Were all society and intercourse cut off between man and man 

 by the primary intention of the Supreme Creator : It seems 

 evident that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of 

 justice as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual 

 regard and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they 

 would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The 

 headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection 

 on future consequences. And as each man is here supposed to 

 love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own 

 activity for safety and happiness, he would, on every occasion, 

 to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every 

 other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of 

 nature or of interest. 



' ' But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established 

 in nature, a family immediately arises ; and particular rules 

 being found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately 

 embraced, though without comprehending the rest of mankind 

 within their prescriptions. Suppose that several families unite 

 together in one society, which is totally disjoined from all 

 others, the rules which preserve peace and order enlarge them- 

 selves to the utmost extent of that society ; but becoming then 

 entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step further. 

 But again, suppose that several distinct societies maintain a 

 kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the 

 boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the 

 largeness of men's views and the force of their mutual connexion. 

 History, experience, reason, sufficiently instruct us in this natural 

 progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement 

 of our regard to justice in proportion as we become acquainted 

 with the extensive utility of that virtue." (IV. pp. 2624.) 



The moral obligation of justice and the rights 

 of property are by no means diminished by this 

 exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on which 

 they rest : 



"For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived 



