XI THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 233 



for any duty, than to observe that human society, or even 

 human nature, could not subsist without the establishment of 

 it, and will still arrive at greater degrees of happiness and 

 perfection, the more inviolable the regard is which is paid to 

 that duty ? 



" The dilemma seems obvious : As justice evidently tends 

 to promote public utility, and to support civil society, the 

 sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on 

 that tendency, or, like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, re- 

 sentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other 

 passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human 

 heart, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes. 

 If the latter be the case, it follows that property, which is the 

 object of justice, is also distinguished by a simple original 

 instinct, and is not ascertained by any argument or reflection. 

 But who is there that ever heard of such an instinct ? Or is 

 this a subject in which new discoveries can be made ? We may 

 as well expect to discover in the body new senses which had 

 before escaped the observation of all mankind." (IV. pp. 273- 

 4.) 



The restriction of the object of justice to pro- 

 perty, in this passage, is singular. Pleasure and 

 pain can hardly be included under the term pro- 

 perty, and yet justice surely deals largely with the 

 withholding of the former, or the infliction of the 

 latter, by men on one another. If a man bars 

 another from a pleasure which he would otherwise 

 enjoy, or actively hurts him without good reason, 

 the latter is said to be injured as much as if his 

 property had been interfered with. Here, indeed, 

 it may be readily shown, that it is as much the 

 interest of society that men should not interfere 

 with one another's freedom, or mutually inflict 

 positive or negative pain, as that they should not 



