234 HUME XI 



meddle with one another's property ; and hence 

 the obligation of justice in such matters may be 

 deduced. But, if a man merely thinks ill of 

 another, or feels maliciously towards him without 

 due cause, he is properly said to be unjust. In 

 this case it would be hard to prove that any injury 

 is done to society by the evil thought ; but there 

 is no question that it will be stigmatised as an 

 injustice ; and the offender himself, in another 

 frame of mind, is often ready enough to admit 

 that he has failed to be just to wards his neighbour. 

 However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight a 

 barrier lies between thought and speech, that any 

 moral quality attached to the latter is easily 

 transferred to the former ; and that, since open 

 slander is obviously opposed to the interests of 

 society, injustice of thought, which is silent 

 slander, must become inextricably associated with 

 the same blame. 



But, granting the utility to society of all kinds 

 of benevolence and justice, why should the 

 quality of those virtues involve the sense of moral 

 obligation ? 



Hume answers this question in the fifth section 

 entitled, " Why Utility Pleases." He repudiates 

 the deduction of moral approbation from self-love, 

 and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent 

 or just actions because we think of the benefits 

 which they are likely to confer indirectly on our- 

 selves. The source of the approbation with which 

 we view an act useful to society must be sought 



