XI THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 235 



elsewhere ; and, in fact, is to be found in that 

 feeling which is called sympathy. 



"No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and 

 misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give 

 pleasure, the second pain. This every one may find in himself. 

 It is not probable that these principles can be resolved into 

 principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may 

 have been made for that purpose." (IV. p. 294, Note.} 



Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles 

 at which we remain unmoved : 



"... The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, 

 like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry 

 our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and 

 satisfaction ; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud 

 or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagin- 

 ation. And this concession being once made, the difficulty is 

 over ; and a natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena 

 of human life will afterwards, we hope, prevail among all 

 speculative inquirers." (IV. p. 320.) 



The moral approbation, therefore, with which 

 we regard acts of justice or benevolence rests upon 

 their utility to society, because the perception of 

 that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure 

 which they give to other men, arouses a feeling of 

 sympathetic pleasure in ourselves. The feeling of 

 obligation to be just, or of the duty of justice, 

 arises out of that association of moral approbation 

 or disapprobation with one's own actions, which is 

 what we call conscience. To fail in justice, or in 

 benevolence, is to be displeased with one's self. But 

 happiness is impossible without inward self- 



