23G HUME . XI 



approval ; and, hence, every man who has any 

 regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find 

 his best reward in the practice of every moral 

 duty. On this topic Hume expends much elo- 

 quence. 



"But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous 

 to society than these here delivered, which represent virtue in 

 all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us 

 approach her with ease, familiarity, and affection ? The 

 dismal dress falls off, with which many divines and some 

 philosophers have covered her ; and nothing appears but gentle- 

 ness, humanity, beneficence, affability ; nay, even at proper 

 intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not of useless 

 austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. She declares 

 that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, and all mankind, 

 during every period of their existence, if possible, cheerful, 

 and happy ; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure 

 but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of 

 their lives. The sole trouble which she demands is that of 

 just calculation, and a steady preference of the greater 

 happiness. And if any austere pretenders approach her, 

 enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them as 

 hypocrites and deceivers, or if she admit them in her train, 

 they are ranked, however, among the least favoured of her 

 votaries. 



" And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes 

 can we ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which 

 we confess full of austerity and rigour ? Or what theory of 

 morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by 

 a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends are 

 also the true interest of each individual ? The peculiar advan- 

 tage of the foregoing system seems to be, that it furnishes 

 proper mediums for that purpose." (IV. p. 360.) 



In this paean to virtue, there is more of the 

 dance measure than will sound appropriate in the 



