254 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



same in these bodies ; that those ideas are in us, 

 the one the perfect resemblance of the other as 

 they are in a mirror ; and it would by most men 

 be judged very extravagant if one should say 

 otherwise. And yet he that will consider that 

 the same fire that at one distance produces in us 

 the sensation of warmth, does at a nearer ap- 

 proach produce in us the far different sensation of 

 pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he 

 has to say that his idea of warmth, which was 

 produced in him by the fire, is actually in the 

 fire; and his idea of pain which the same fire 

 produced in him in the same way, is not in the 

 fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, 

 and pain not, when it produces the one and the 

 other idea in us ; and can do neither but by the 

 bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid 

 parts ? " l 



Thus far then materialists and idealists are 

 agreed. Locke and Berkeley, and all logical 

 thinkers who have succeeded them, are of one 

 mind about secondary qualities their being is to 

 be perceived or known their materiality is, in 

 strictness, a spirituality. 



But Locke draws a great distinction between 

 the secondary qualities of matter, and certain 

 others which he terms " primary qualities." These 

 are extension, figure, solidity, motion and rest, 

 and number ; and he is as clear that these 



1 Locke, Human Understanding, Book II. chap. viii. 14, 15. 



