THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 255 



primary qualities exist independently of the mind, 

 as he is that the secondary qualities have no such 

 existence. 



"The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the 

 parts of fire and snow are really in them, whether any one's 

 senses perceive them or not, and therefore they may be called 

 real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies ; but 

 light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, 

 than sickness, or pain, is in manna. Take away the sensation 

 of them ; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear 

 sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell ; and all 

 colours, tastes, odours and sounds, as they are such particular 

 ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. 

 bulk, figure, and motion of parts. 



"18. A piece of manna of sensible bulk is able to produce in 

 us the idea of a round or square figure ; and, by being removed 

 from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of 

 motion represents it as it really is in the manna moving ; a 

 circle and square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in 

 the mind or in the manna ; and thus both motion and figure 

 are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them or no : 

 this everybody is ready to agree to." 



So far as primary qualities are concerned, then, 

 Locke is as thoroughgoing a realist as St. Anselm. 

 In Berkeley, on the other hand, we have as com- 

 plete a representative of the nominalists and 

 conceptualists an intellectual descendant of 

 Roscellinus and of Abelard. 1 And by a curious 

 irony of fate, it is the nominalist who is, this 

 time, the champion of orthodoxy, and the realist 

 that of heresy. 



Once more let us try to work out Berkeley's 

 1 See note B. 



