256 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



principles for ourselves, and inquire what founda- 

 tion there is for the assertion that extension, form, 

 solidity, and the other " primary qualities," have 

 an existence apart from mind. And for this pur- 

 pose let us recur to our experiment with the pin. 



It has been seen that when the finger is pricked 

 with a pin, a state of consciousness arises which 

 we call pain ; and it is admitted that this pain is 

 not a something which inheres in the pin, but a 

 something which exists only in the mind, and has 

 no similitude elsewhere. 



But a little attention will show that this state 

 of consciousness is accompanied by another, which 

 can by no effort be got rid of. I not only have 

 the feeling, but the feeling is localized. I am just 

 as certain that the pain is in my finger, as I am 

 that I have it at all. Nor will any effort of the 

 imagination enable me to believe that the pain is 

 not in my finger. 



And yet nothing is more certain than that it is 

 not, and cannot be, in the spot in which I feel it, 

 nor within a couple of feet of that spot. For 

 the skin of the finger is connected by a bundle of 

 fine nervous fibres, which run up the whole length 

 of the arm, to the spinal marrow, which sets them 

 in communication with the brain, and we know 

 that the feeling of pain caused by the prick of a 

 pin is dependent on the integrity of those fibres. 

 After they have been cut through close to the 

 spinal cord, no pain will be felt, whatever injury 



