258 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



because the brain is the sole seat of consciousness ; 

 and, further, because evidence, as strong as that 

 in favour of the sensation being in the finger, can 

 be brought forward in support of propositions 

 which are manifestly absurd. For example, the 

 hairs and nails are utterly devoid of sensibility, as 

 every one knows. Nevertheless, if the ends of 

 the nails or hairs are touched, ever so lightly, we 

 feel that they are touched, and the sensation 

 seems to be situated in the nails or hairs. Nay 

 more, if a walking-stick, a yard long, is held 

 firmly by the handle and the other end is touched, 

 the tactile sensation, which is a state of our own 

 consciousness, is unhesitatingly referred to the 

 end of the stick ; and yet no one will say that it 

 is there. 



Let us now suppose that, instead of one pin's 

 point resting against the end of my finger, there 

 are two. Each of these can be known to me, as 

 we have seen, only as a state of a thinking mind, 

 referred outwards, or localized. But the existence 

 of these two states, somehow or other, generates 

 in my mind a number of new ideas, which did not 

 make their appearance when only one state was 

 present. For example, I get the ideas of co-exist- 

 ence, of number, of distance, and of relative place 

 or direction. But all these ideas are ideas of rela- 

 tions, and may be said to imply the existence of 

 something which perceives those relations. If a 

 tactile sensation is a state of the mind, and if 



