264 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



opinions which he published in the "Essay to- 

 wards the New Theory of Vision." 



" It will be objected that we see things actually without, or 

 at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in 

 the mind ; it being absurd that those things which are seen at 

 the distance of several miles, should be as near to us as our own 

 thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be considered 

 thakin a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great 

 distance off, and yet, for all that, those things are acknowledged 

 fc> have their existence only in the mind. 



' ' But for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth 

 while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things 

 placed at a distance by sight. For that we should in truth see 

 external space and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, 

 others further off, seems to carry with it some opposition to 

 what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the 

 mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave 

 birth to my "Essay towards the New Theory of Vision" which 

 was published not long since, wherein it is shown that distance, 

 or outness, is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, 

 nor yet apprehended, or judged of, by lines and angles or any- 

 thing that hath any necessary connection with it ; but that it 

 is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and 

 sensations attending vision, which, in their own nature, have 

 no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or with 

 things placed at a distance ; but by a connection taught us by 

 experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after 

 the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas 

 they are made to stand for ; insomuch that a man born blind 

 and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the 

 things he saw to be without his mind or at any distance from 

 him." 



The key-note of the Essay to which Berkeley 

 refers in this passage is to be found in an italicized 

 paragraph of section 127 : 



