THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 265 



" The extensions, figures, and motions perceived by sight arc 

 specifically distinct from the ideas of touch called by the same 

 names ; nor is there any such thing as an idea or kind of idea 

 common to both senses." 



It will be observed that this proposition ex- 

 pressly declares that extension, figure, and motion, 

 and consequently 'distance, are immediately per- 

 ceived by sight as well as by touch; but that 

 visual distance, extension, figure, and motion, are 

 totally different in quality from the ideas of the 

 same name obtained through the sense of touch. 

 And other passages leave no doubt that such was 

 Berkeley's meaning. Thus in the 112th section 

 of the same Essay, he carefully defines the two 

 kinds of distance, one visual, the other tangible : 



"By the distance between any two points nothing more is 

 meant than the number of intermediate points. If the given 

 points are visible, the distance between them is marked out by 

 the number of interjacent visible points ; if they are tangible, 

 the distance between them is a line consisting of tangible 

 points." 



Again, there are two sorts of magnitude or ex- 

 tension : 



" It has been shown that there are two sorts of objects appre- 

 hended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude or 

 extension : the one properly tangible, i.e., to be perceived and 

 measured by touch, and not immediately falling under the sense 

 of seeing ; the other properly and immediately visible, by 

 mediation of which the former is brought into view." 55. 



But how are we to reconcile these passages with 

 others which will be perfectly familiar to every 



