THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 269 



tions. In speaking of sight, on the other hand, 

 Berkeley employs " outness " to denote corporeal 

 separation. 



When due allowance is made for the occasional 

 looseness and ambiguity of Berkeley's terminology, 

 and the accessories are weeded out of the essen- 

 tial parts of his famous Essay, his views may, I 

 believe, be fairly and accurately summed up in 

 the following propositions : 



1. The sense of touch gives rise to ideas of 

 extension, figure, magnitude, and motion. 



2. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of 

 " outness," in the sense of localization. 



3. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of 

 resistance, and thence to that of solidity, in the 

 sense of impenetrability. 



4. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of 

 "outness," in the sense of distance in the third 

 dimension, and thence to that of space or geome- 

 trical solidity. 



5. The sense of sight gives rise to ideas of ex- 

 tension, of figure, magnitude, and motion. 



6. The sense of sight does not give rise to the 

 idea of " outness," in the sense of distance in the 

 third dimension, nor to that of geometrical solidity, 

 no visual idea appearing to be without the mind, 

 or at any distance off ( 43, 50). 



7. The sense of sight does not give rise to the 

 idea of mechanical solidity. 



8. There is no likeness whatever between the 



