272 THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 



ought to be reversed. For I think that any one 

 who interrogates his consciousness carefully will 

 find that " every proper visual idea " appears to be 

 without the mind and at a distance off. 



Not only does every visibile appear to be 

 remote, but it has a position in external space, 

 just as a tangibile appears to be superficial and to 

 have a determinate position on the surface of the 

 body. Every visibile, in fact, appears (approxi- 

 mately) to be situated upon a line drawn from it 

 to the point of the retina on which its image falls. 

 It is referred outwards, in the general direction of 

 the pencil of light by which it is rendered visible, 

 just as, in the experiment with the stick, the tangi- 

 bile is referred outwards to the end of the stick. 



It is for this reason that an object, viewed with 

 both eyes, is seen single and not double. Two 

 distinct images are formed, but each image is 

 referred to that point at which the two optic axes 

 intersect ; consequently, the two images cover 

 one another, and appear as completely one as any 

 other two equally similar super-imposed images 

 would be. 1 And it is for the same reason, that, if 

 the side of the ball of the eye is pressed upon at 

 any point, a spot of light appears apparently 

 outside the eye, and in a region exactly opposite 

 to that in which the pressure is made. 



But while it seems to me that there is no reason 



1 In the case of a near, solid, external object, such as a cube, 

 this is not the whole story. 



