THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION 285 



the substance of these particles has existed and will exist, that the 

 energy which stirs them has persisted and will persist, without 

 assignable limit, either in the past or the future. Surely, as 

 Heracleitus said of his kitchen with its pots and pans, "Here 

 also are the gods." Little as we have, even yet, learned of the 

 material universe, that little makes for the belief that it is a 

 system of unbroken order and perfect symmetry, of which the 

 form incessantly changes, while the substance and the energy 

 are imperishable. 



It will be understood that those who are thoroughly imbued 

 with this view of what is called "matter" find it a little 

 difficult to understand why that which is termed " mind " 

 should give itself such airs of superiority over the twin sister ; 

 to whom, so far as our planet is concerned, it might be 

 hazardous to deny the right of primogeniture. 



Accepting the ordinary view of mind, it is a substance the 

 properties of which are states of consciousness, on the one 

 hand, and energy of the same order as that of the material 

 world (or else it would not be able to affect the latter) on 

 the other hand. It is admitted that chance has no more place 

 in the world of mind, than it has in that of matter. Sensations, 

 emotions, intellections are subject to an order, as strict and inviol- 

 able as that which obtains among material things. If the order 

 which obtains in the material world lays it open to the reproach 

 of subjection to "blind necessity," the demonstrable existence 

 of a similar order amidst the phenomena of consciousness 

 (and without the belief in that fixed order, logic has no binding 

 force and morals have no foundation) renders it obnoxious to the 

 same condemnation. For necessity is necessity, and whether it 

 is blind or sharp-eyed is nothing to the purpose. 



Even if the supposed energy of the substance of mind is 

 sometimes exerted without any antecedent cause which is the 

 only intelligible sense of the popular doctrine of free-will the 

 occurrence is admittedly exceptional, and, by the nature of 

 the case, it is not susceptible of proof. Moreover, if the hypo- 

 thetical substance of mind is possessed of energy, I, for my 

 part, am unable to see how it is to be discriminated from the 

 hypothetical substance of matter. 



