LECTnii s ny i:voi.rTi>\ m 



I bare already - i that, in dealing with 



tli. -e three hypotheses, in endeavouring to form a 

 j u ,l_ to whieh of them is the more worthy 



,f belief. ..r whether none is worthy of belief in 

 whieh case our eondition of mind should be that 

 suspension of judgment whieh is so difficult to all 

 hut trained intellects we should be indifferent 

 to all a priori considerations. The question is a 

 question of historical fact. The universe has come 

 into existence somehow or other, and the problem 

 K whether it came into existence in one fashion, 

 or whether it came into existence in another; ami, 

 as an essential preliminary to further discussion, 

 permit me to say two or three words as to the 

 nature and the kinds of historical evidence. 



The evidence as to the occurrence of any event 

 in past time .may be ranged under two heads 

 which, for convenience' sake, I will speak of as 

 testimonial evidence and as circumstantial evi- 

 dence. By testimonial evidence I mean human 

 testimony ; and by circumstantial evidence I 

 niran evidence which is not human testimony. 

 Let me illustrate by a familiar example what I 

 understand by these two kinds of evidence, and 

 what is to be said respecting their value. 



Suppose that a man tells you that he saw a 

 person strike another and kill him; that is testi- 

 monial < \idence of the fact of murder. But it is 

 possible to have circumstantial evidence of the 

 of murder: that is to say, you may find a 



