IX.] EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. 215 



every ethical decision is in truth a preference, an election 

 of one act as higher than another, appears of fundamental 

 importance in the analysis of the moral sentiments." 



From this point of view it is plain how trifling are 

 arguments drawn from the acts of a savage, since an action 

 highly immoral in us might be one exceedingly virtuous 

 in him being 'the highest presented to his choice in 

 his degraded intellectual condition and peculiar circum- 

 stances. 



It need only be contended, then, that there is a 

 perception of " right " incapable of further analysis ; not 

 that there is any infallible internal guide as to all the 

 complex actions which present themselves for choice. The 

 principle is given in our nature, the application of the 

 principle is the result of a thousand educational influences. 



It is no wonder, then, that, in complex " cases of 

 conscience," it is sometimes a matter of exceeding difficulty 

 to determine which of two courses of action is the less 

 objectionable. This no more invalidates the truth of 

 moral principles than does the difficulty of a mathematical 

 problem cast doubt on mathematical principles. Habit, 

 education, and intellectual gifts, facilitate the correct appli- 

 cation of both. 



Again, if our moral insight is intensified or blunted by 

 our habitual wishes, or, indirectly, by our physical condition, 

 the same may be said of our perception of the true rela- 

 tions of physical facts one to another. An eager wish for 

 marriage has led many a man to exaggerate the powers 

 of a limited income, and a fit of dyspepsia has given 

 an unreasonably gloomy aspect to more than one balance*- 

 sheet. 



Considering that moral intuitions have to do with 

 insensible matters, they cannot be expected to be more 

 clear than the perception of physical facts. And if the 

 latter perceptions may be influenced by volition, desire, or 



