XH.] THEOLOGY AND EVOLUTION. 267 



can be no question but that the first conception is immeas- 

 urably nearer the- truth than the second. Yet the latter is 

 the one put forward and advocated by that author in spite 

 of its unreasonableness, and in spite also of its conflicting 

 with the whole moral nature of man and all his noblest 

 aspirations. 



Again, Mr. Herbert Spencer objects to the conception 

 of God as " first cause," on the ground that " when our sym- 

 bolic conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect 

 processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there 

 are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made 

 whose" fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether 

 vicious and illusive, and in no way j distinguishable from 

 pure fictions." " 



Now, it is quite true that " symbolic conceptions," which 

 are not to be justified either (1) by presentations of sense, 

 or (2) by intuitions, are invalid as representations of real 

 truth. Yet the conception of God referred to is justified by 

 our primary intuitions, and we can assure ourselves that it 

 does stand for an actuality by comparing it with (1) our 

 intuitions of free-will and causation, and (2) our intuitions 

 of morality and responsibility. That we have these intui- 

 tions is a point on which the author joins issue with Mr. 

 Spencer, and confidently affirms that they cannot logically 

 be denied without at the same time complete and absolute 

 skepticism resulting from such denial skepticism wherein 

 vanishes any certainty as to the existence both of Mr. 

 Spencer and his critic, and by which it is equally impossible 

 to have a thought free from doubt, or to go so far as to 

 affirm the existence of that very doubt or of the doubter who 

 doubts it. 



It may not be amiss here to protest against the intoler- 

 able assumption of a certain school, who are continually 

 talking in lofty terms of " science," but who actually speak 

 11 Loc. cit., p. 29. 



