II EVOLUTION AND ETHICS 5? 



or expressed, understanding; and having made 

 the very important advance upon wolf society, 

 that they agree to use the force of the whole body 

 against individuals who violate it and in favour of 

 those who observe it. This observance of a com- 

 mon understanding, with the consequent distribu- 

 tion of punishments and rewards according to 

 accepted rules, received the name of justice, while 

 the contrary was called injustice. Early ethics 

 did not take much note of the animus of the 

 violator of the rules. But civilization could not 

 advance far, without the establishment of a 

 capital distinction between the case of involun- 

 tary and that of wilful misdeed ; between a merely 

 wrong action and a guilty one. And, with increas- 

 ing refinement of moral appreciation, the problem 

 of desert, which arises out of this distinction, 

 acquired more and more theoretical and practical 

 importance. If life must be given for life, yet it 

 was recognized that the unintentional slayer did 

 not altogether deserve death; and, by a sort of 

 compromise between the public and the private 

 conception of justice, a sanctuary was provided 

 in which he might take refuge from the avenger 

 of blood. 



The idea of justice thus underwent a gradual 

 sublimation from punishment and reward accord- 

 ing to acts, to punishment and reward according to 

 desert ; or, in other words, according to motive. 

 Righteousness, that is, action from right motive, 



