EASTERN QUESTION, THE. 



263 



these conflicts of interests are mixed up ques- 

 tions of the movements of races and the rights 

 of nationalities, so closely that it is almost im- 

 possible to separate them, or judge of a single 

 point upon its own merits. 



The enemies of Russia assert that the protec- 

 tion of the Christian nationalities of Turkey is 

 only the pretext which that Power is using to 

 cover a plan for the extension of its dominions, 

 and for carrying out the grand scheme of con- 

 quest which is the ambition of the Panslavist 

 dreamers. They predict that the fall of Tur- 

 key will be followed by attacks on other na- 

 tions which the Slavs claim. They allege that 

 the events which led to the war, and gave the 

 pretext for declaring it, were all produced from 

 the beginning by Russian intrigue ; that the 

 discontent in the Turkish provinces is carefully 

 excited and nursed by Russian agents ; and that 

 every device of ingenuity is exercised to pro- 

 mote misunderstanding between the Porte and 

 its subjects. No evidence has been published 

 to contradict the theory that the Russian Gov- 

 ernment acted in good faith through all the 

 movements precedent to the war ; but it seems 

 to be well established that the Slavic commit- 

 tees, which represent the Panslavic organiza- 

 tion of Russia, were very active in Bosnia and 

 Herzegovina in 1875 and 1876, and afterward 

 in Servia and Bulgaria, and that they were the 

 main supporters of the Bosnian insurrection. 

 They had regular agents at Oettigne and Ragusa, 

 who attended to the reception and distribution 

 of the funds and supplies which were sent 

 from Russia, ostensibly for the relief of the 

 sick and wounded and fugitive insurrectionists, 

 but really as much for the support of the in- 

 surrection ; for their hospital director at Cet- 

 tigne boasted that one half of the money sent 

 was spent in procuring wounded to tend, while 

 the other half was employed in healing them. 

 They were likewise busy during the Servian 

 war in organizing committees throughout Rus- 

 sia, exciting popular interest in their schemes, 

 and manufacturing public opinion, with such 

 success that the Czar was forced, by the press- 

 ure around him, to make his speech at Mos- 

 cow on November 11, 1876, in which he styled 

 himself the champion of the Slavic cause, and 

 was regarded as committing himself to the 

 programme of war. 



The bearing of these facts upon the general 

 question becomes more clear when it is under- 

 stood that the efforts of the Slavic committees 

 are not directed to the Slavic Christians of 

 Turkey alone, but that their intrigues are 

 aimed at all the Slavic communities of Europe, 

 and that they aspire to separate such communi- 

 ties from whatever nations they may now be 

 connected with, and to form of them' a grand 

 Slavic empire. This scheme is fraught with 

 particular danger to Austro-Hungary, nearly 

 half of whose people are Slavs of one name or 

 another, not at all contented with the present 

 rule ; and especially to Hungary, whose scat- 

 tered Magyars would be overwhelmed in the 



case of a successful insurrection of the Slavs. 

 It is quite natural, then, that the Hungarian 

 statesmen should be alarmed at the prospect 

 of Russian advance in the south, should cry 

 out against it, as Klapka and Kossuth have 

 done in addresses and publications, as the 

 greatest disaster that could befall Hungary, and 

 should have advised support of Turkey as a 

 measure of protection against the growth of 

 the Panslavic monster. 



The interest of Great Britain is less strong 

 than that of Austro-Hungary. It is purely 

 commercial, and is, therefore, not vital to the 

 existence of the nation, although very impor- 

 tant in its bearing upon the safety of the Indian 

 Empire. The appreciation of it was sharpened 

 by the rapid advances which Russia made in 

 Central Asia, and which threatened to bring a 

 rival Power in dangerous proximity to the East 

 Indian possessions, but has become less intense 

 since the possession of the Suez Canal has 

 given England a route to India independent of 

 any influence which Russia may be able to ex- 

 ercise from the Black Sea or from Armenia. 

 For many years a scheme for a railway from 

 some Turkish port, through the Euphrates val- 

 ley to the Persian Gulf, was favored by British 

 statesmen and capitalists, as affording a favor- 

 able short route to India ; and the idea of tol- 

 erating any advance of Russia, southward or 

 westward, in Asia, was repelled as involving 

 injury not only to the security of this route, 

 but to the integrity of the Indian Empire. Since 

 the British Government acquired a controlling 

 interest in the Suez Canal, in 1875, its atten- 

 tion, and that of the British public, has been 

 rather directed to developing and defending 

 that route, which is already open and in opera- 

 tion, than to cultivating an extraordinary so- 

 licitude about a route which is as yet wholly 

 in prospect, and involves the expenditure of 

 immense sums of money. Under the influence 

 of a calm discussion of the bearings of the case, 

 the English have become less anxious about 

 the fate of the Euphrates valley, and many 

 statesman, even of the anti-Russian party, have 

 acknowledged that Russian extension in Asia 

 will not justify interference. The British na- 

 tion still expresses the determination to main- 

 tain the security of Egypt and the neutrality 

 of Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the 

 Bosporus, as toward the European Powers. 

 The former is not at present endangered, and 

 the latter is acknowledged by Russia to be a 

 European question, subject to the decision of 

 the Powers. 



The most difficult question to decide, in case 

 of a rearrangement of Turkey, is as to what 

 disposition shall be made of the European 

 provinces after the Turks are driven from them. 

 No people among all the nationalities could 

 take the place of the Turks as rulers, for not 

 only is no single people strong enough to rule 

 the whole country, but no one of the national- 

 ities would submit to the exclusive rule of an- 

 other under any conditions. It is agreed that 



