THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 195 



the first to introduce the title of metazoa, and oppose 

 these multicellular, tissue-forming animals to the 

 unicellular protozoa (infusoria, rhizopods, etc.), and as 

 I was the first to point out the essential difference in 

 the development of the two (the former from germinal 

 layers, and the latter not), I must protest that I 

 consider the protozoa to be just as mortal in the physio- 

 logical (and psychological) sense as the metazoa; 

 neither body nor soul is immortal in either group. 

 The other erroneous consequences of TVeismann's 

 notion have been refuted by Moebius (1884), who 

 justly remarks that "every event in the world is 

 periodic," and that "there is no source from which 

 immortal organic individuals might have sprung." 



When we take the idea of immortality in the widest 

 sense, and extend it to the totality of the knowable 

 universe, it has a scientific significance ; it is then not 

 merely acceptable, but self-evident, to the monistic 

 philosopher. In that sense the thesis of the inde- 

 structibility and eternal duration of all that exists is 

 equivalent to our supreme law of nature, the law oj 

 substance (see chap. xii.). As we intend to discuss 

 this immortality of the cosmos fully later on, in 

 establishing the theory of the persistence of matter 

 and force, we shall not dilate on it at present. We 

 pass on immediately to the criticism of that belief in 

 immortality which is the only sense usually attached 

 to the word, the immortality of the individual soul. 

 We shall first inquire into the extent and the origin 

 of this mystic and dualistic notion, and point out, in 

 particular, the wide acceptance of the contradictory 

 thesis, our monistic, empirically-established thanatism. 

 I must distinguish two essentially different forms 

 of thanatism — primary and secondary ; primary 



