276 CRITIQUES AND ADDRESSES. [xi. 



He begins by laying down the following proposition : 

 " c Sensation ' is not ' thought/ and no amount of 

 the former would constitute the most rudimentary 

 condition of the latter, though sensations supply the 

 conditions for the existence of 'thought' or 'know- 

 ledge'" (p. 67). 



This proposition is true, or not, according to the sense 

 in which the word " thought " is employed. Thought is 

 not uncommonly used in a sense co-extensive with 

 consciousness, and, especially, with those states of 

 consciousness we call memory. If I recall the impres- 

 sion made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly 

 remember blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect 

 propriety that I "think of" blue or musk; and, so 

 long as the thought lasts, it is simply a faint repro- 

 duction of the state of consciousness to which I gave 

 the name in question, when it first became known to me 

 as a sensation. 



Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, which 

 we call the memory of it, is properly termed a thought, 

 it seems to me to be a somewhat forced proceeding to 

 draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between 

 thoughts and sensations. If sensations are not rudi- 

 mentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts 

 are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound con- 

 stitutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend 

 that an echo is something of totally different nature 

 from a sound. Again, nothing can be looser, or more 

 inaccurate, than the assertion that ''sensations supply 

 the conditions for the existence of thought or know- 

 ledge." If this implies that sensations supply the 

 conditions for the existence of our memory of sensa- 

 tions or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism 

 which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. 

 If it implies that sensations supply anything else, it is 



