31 



In the case of the United States v. George H. Wilbur, involving a grazing trespass 

 on the Crook National Forest, settlement has been made by the payment of $50.03, 

 the amount in full of the Government's demand. 



Grazing Trespass: Constitutionality of National Forests Organic and Administrative 



Acts 



On May 1, 1911, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down decisions 

 in the cases of United States v. Fred Light, and United States v. Grimaud, Carajous 

 and Inda, in all of which the court sustained the constitutionality of that part of the 

 act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat., 11), which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to 

 make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects 

 of the National Forests, for the violation of which regulations the act prescribes a 

 punishment. 



The case of United States v. Fred Light was an action by the United States to 

 restrain Light from pasturing stock upon the Holy Cross National Forest, Colo., 

 without a permit from the Secretary of Agriculture. Light defended on the ground 

 that the laws of Colorado make it indispensable to the maintenance of such an action 

 that the owner of land must fence it against trespassing stock, and that the act of 

 June 4, 1897, is unconstitutional because it delegates legislative authority to the 

 Secretary of Agriculture to make and define a crime, and that the act of March 3, 1891, 

 authorizing the President to set aside public lands as National Forests, is also uncon- 

 stitutional and can not authorize the creation of forests without the consent of the 

 State in which the lands are situated. The substance of the decision of the Supreme 

 Court is as follows: 



1. The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its 

 property may be used and can withhold or reserve the land indefinitely, and this, 

 without the consent of the State in which it is situated. 



2. The long-continued sufferance by the United States of the pasturing of cattle 

 on the public lands did not confer upon anyone a vested right to the use of those 

 lands for that purpose; nor could it deprive the United States of the power of 

 recalling the implied license arising therefrom so to do. 



3. The Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary 

 proprietor to maintain its possession and prosecute trespassers, and it may deal 

 with such lands precisely as an ordinary individual may deal with his farming 

 property. (United States v. Canfield, 167 U. S., 524.) 



4. Section 24 of the act of March 3, 1891 , authorizing the President of the United 

 States to set apart and reserve public lands bearing forests as national forests, 

 is constitutional. 



5. The act of June 4, 1897, conferring upon the Secretary of Agriculture author- 

 ity to make rules and regulations for the administration of the national forests, 

 is constitutional, and the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, made and 

 promulgated thereunder, requiring all persons to secure permits before grazing 

 any stock in a national forest, is valid and enforceable. (United States v. Gri- 

 maud, decided same day.) 



6. Statutes providing that no recovery can be had for damages done by tres- 

 passing animals unless the land had been inclosed with a fence of the size and 

 material required by State law do not give permission to the owner of cattle to 

 use another's unfenced land as a pasture, and, therefore, if the statute of Colorado 

 requiring owners to fence their land against straying stock is at all enforceable 

 against the United States such a statute does not afford immunity to one who 

 intentionally and willfully pastures and allows his stock to graze in the national 

 forests. 



