LICENCE TO ENTER LAND, WHEN IRREVOCABLE. 71 



have passage for the water, fur a freehold interest, required a deed to 

 create it ; and that as there has beeu no deed in this case, the present 

 action, which is founded on a right and title, cannot be supported." In 

 Fentiman v. Smith, where the plaintiff claimed to have passage for 

 water by a tunnel over defendant's land, Lord EUenhoroufjh C.J. laid it 

 down distinctly that "the title to have the water flowing in a tunnel over 

 the defendant's land could not pass by parol licence without deed ; and 

 the plaintiff" could not be entitled to it as stated in the declaration, by 

 reason of \\\% possession of the mill, but he had it by the licence of the 

 defendant, or by contract with hun, and if by licence it was revocable 

 at any time." 



^Vell V. Paternoster, Wood v. Lake, and Taijlor v. Waters, were not 

 cases of freehold interest, and in none of them was the objection taken 

 that the right lay in grant, and therefore could not pass without deed. 

 In Webb v. Paternoster there was a licence to the plaintiff" from Sir 

 William Plummer, to lay a stack of hay on his land, for a reasonaljle 

 time. Afterwards Sir William leased the land, and the lessee turned 

 in his cattle and ate the hay {mise ses avers in c'est acre, queur eleroure 

 le code lie hay). The Court held that such licence was good, and could 

 not be countermanded within a reasonable time, but that more than a 

 reasonable time had elapsed, viz., half-a-year, and that therefore the 

 licence was at an end. The question in Wood v. Lalce was whether a 

 parol agreement for the liberty to stack coals upon land is good for 

 seven years, and Lee C.J. and De/nison J. thought that it was, as the 

 agreement was only for an easement, and not for an interest in land. 



These cases, as well as that of Taylor v. Waters (in which the 

 plaintiff, who had purchased a silver opera ticket, was held entitled to 

 a verdict of 28 guineas, as the damage for two years' exclusion from 

 the opera, where they refused to recognise it), established that a licence 

 to enjoy a beneficial privilege on land may be granted without deed, 

 and notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, without writing. The 

 grounds of the judgment of Gibbs C.J., which was here upheld by the 

 Court of Common Pleas, were that the right under the silver ticket 

 was not an interest in land, but a licence irrevocable to permit the 

 plaintiff to enjoy certain privileges thereon ; that it was not required 

 by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, and conseqiiently might be 

 granted without deed. The Court of Exchequer, however, in Wood v. 

 Leadbittcr, considered Taylor v. Waters " to the last degree unsatisfac- 

 tory — an observation we have the less hesitation in making, in conse- 

 quence of its unsoundness having previously been doubted by the Court 

 of King's Bench and Mr. Justice Bayloy, in the case of Hewlins v. 

 Shippamr And per Alderson B. : " Although the older authorities 



